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We present a model of risk averse exporting firm subject to liquidity constraints. The firm enters an unbiased futures 
market  to  hedge  exchange  rate  risk  and  may  not  be  able to satisfy high margin calls. Then the firm is forced  to 
prematurely liquidate the futures position. We show that preferences and expectations become important for optimum 
export and hedging decisions, i.e. separation theorem and full hedge theorem are violated. Furthermore, international 
trade is affected, for only firms that have sufficient financial resources fully exploid gains from trade. 
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Recently, liquidity have become a major concern of international ﬁrms. An
increasing number of articles in international trade study the relationship
between the ﬁrm’s liquidity constraints and export production. Di erent av-
enues of research exist: In the context of credit constraints the export decision
is related to heterogeneity of international ﬁrms, to ﬁnancing ﬁxed costs to
begin exporting activity, to di erences in wealth endowment of ﬁrms and
to equity market liberalizations (see Manova, 2008, Friberg and Wilander,
2008).
The theory of international trade under uncertainty has a long tradition
(see Helpman and Razin, 1978, Grinols, 1987, Broll, Wahl and Zilcha, 1995).
Under uncertainty liquidity constraints lead to interesting implications for
decision making. For example, futures hedging of foreign exchange risk has to
cope with an additional liquidity risk, since highly volatile futures prices may
heavily move against the ﬁrm. Then management is forced to prematurely
liquidate currency futures positions for liquidity reasons. We present a model
of a risk averse exporting ﬁrm subject to liquidity constraints hedging foreign
exchange exposure through futures contracts.
The standard futures hedging model in international trade under ex-
change rate uncertainty leads to the so called separation theorem and full
hedge theorem (Kawai and Zilcha, 1986). Liquidity constraints for multina-
tionals have been introduced in this framework (Lien and Wong, 2005, Meng
and Wong, 2007). This paper also studies a liquidity constrained ﬁrm. We
assume that management acts under a given limit of futures price upward
movements. If this price threshold is exceeded management closes out the
currency futures position. Our objective is to investigate on the validity of
well-known results from the literature onf u t u r e sh e d g i n ga n di n t e r n a t i o n a l
trade. We show that an underhedge may be optimal for the ﬁrm although
the currency futures market is unbiased.F u r t h e r m o r e ,o v e r c o m i n gﬁ n a n c i a l
constraints in satisfying margin calls clearly increases exports. A gradual
widening of ﬁnancial markets, however, may have an adverse e ect on trade
ﬂows depending on the prudence aspect of preferences.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the model of the
ﬁrm’s futures hedging decision under a liquidity constraint when export pro-
duction is given. We derive a ‘prudent hedge theorem’. In section 3, the
ﬁrm’s optimal behavior regarding export production and futures hedging is
analyzed under the assumption of a shortage of ﬁnancial resources. If there
2is a positive probability that the international ﬁrm lacks su cient liquidity
then separating production from hedging is no longer optimal. A constraint
on liquidity creates a risk e ect upon export production and, therefore, upon
international trade.S e c t i o n4c o n c l u d e s .
2. Hedging model
First we focus on the hedging motive. Suppose the following hedging pol-
icy of a risk averse exporting ﬁrm: Random export revenue is hedged by
futures contracts. Since the ﬁrm faces a liquidity constraint management
policy calls for closing out the ﬁrm’s futures position if a threshold of an
unfavorable exchange rate movement is exceeded during maturity. Margin
calls due to marking to market cannotb es a t i s ﬁ e db e c a u s et h eﬁ r ml a c k s
su cient liquidity.
In what follows we present some assumptions which hold throughout the
paper.
Liquidity setting. The ﬁrm has access to liquidity up to the amount L0
denoted in domestic currency. Let f0 denote the futures rate of the futures
contract and ˜ f the random futures price during maturity of the futures con-
tract. Hedging volume is given by H denoted in foreign currency. The ﬁrm is
forced to prematurely liquidate its futures position if the liquidity constraint
(f   f0)H   L0 is violated, where f is a realization of ˜ f.H e n c e , i f t h e
observed futures price exceeds a threshold during maturity, then the margin
call exceeds the amount of liquidity available to the ﬁrm. Management then
closes out its futures position. We assume that threshold k depends upon
liquidity, i.e. k = k(L0),k   = dk/dL0 > 0. In words, the more liquidity the
ﬁrm has, the higher the threshold, which is denoted in foreign currency to
domestic currency. Threshold k is given by risk policy of the ﬁrm.
Economic setting. ˜ e1 deﬁnes the random foreign exchange spot rate
at maturity of the futures contract. The currency futures market is called
unbiased, i.e. f0 = E(˜ e1), where E denotes the mathematical expectation’s
operator. e1 is the spot rate that prevails at maturity of the futures contract.
Stochastic setting. ˜ e1 = ˜ f +˜  ,w h e r e˜   is a zero-mean random variable
conditionally independent (Ingersoll 1987) of the random futures price during
maturity ˜ f.
Hence the observation f of the futures price is equal to the conditional
expected value of ˜ e1,i . e .f = E(˜ e1|f)f o ra l lf.I tf o l l o w st h a tE( ˜ f)=E(˜ e1)
and, therefore, Ef k(f0   ˜ f)+Ef>k(f0   ˜ f)=f0  E(˜ e1). With an unbiased
3currency futures market we get Ef k(f0   ˜ f)= Ef>k(f0   ˜ f).
Time setting. The timing of events is shown in ﬁgure 1. For no-arbitrage
reasons realizations of ˜ f1 and ˜ e1 must equate at the end of maturity of the




Random futures price during maturity: ˜ f
Closing out position: f>koccurs
˜ f1
Hedge:H Maturity of futures contract Revenue: ˜ e1PQ 0
Figure 1: Time schedule
2.1 Short hedge position
Suppose an unfavorable exchange rate movement forces an exporting ﬁrm to
closing out its futures position prematurely. Is there any incentive for the
ﬁrm to hedge exchange rate risk if this movement occurs with some positive
probability?
To examine the hedging motive we ﬁrst suppose that export production
Q0 is ﬁxed when the ﬁrm enters the futures market. The exporting ﬁrm’s
random proﬁt at maturity of the futures contract is deﬁned by:




˜ e1, if f   k,
˜ f, if f>k ,
where k is the exogenously given foreign exchange futures rate threshold of
the exporting ﬁrm. This threshold accounts for the liquidity constraint of
the ﬁrm to carry out margin calls of the futures contract.
The ﬁrm chooses the level of its futures position, H,s oa st om a x i m i z e
expected utility of random proﬁts:
max
H
EU(˜  ), (2)
4where ˜  i sd e ﬁ n e di ne q u a t i o n( 1 ) .
Let us reformulate expected utility in order to account for the liquidity
constraint:
EU(˜  ) = Ef kU(˜ e1PQ 0 +( f0   ˜ e1)H)+
Ef>kU(˜ e1PQ 0 +( f0   ˜ f)H)
= Ef kE [U(( ˜ f +˜  )PQ 0 +( f0   ( ˜ f +˜  ))H)] +
Ef>kE [U(( ˜ f +˜  )PQ 0 +( f0   ˜ f)H)]. (3)
Note that the domain f   k implies ˜  =(˜ f +˜  )(PQ 0  H)+f0H   ˜  d.
However, the domain f>krequires ˜  = ˜ f(PQ 0   H)+f0H +˜  PQ0   ˜  u.
We observe: ˜  u = ˜  d +˜  H. The di erence in random proﬁts comes from an
additional endogenous risk which has other implications than the so called
background or idiosyncratic risk (see, e.g., Franke et al. 2004).
Using expected utility from equation (3) in decision problem (2), the ﬁrst-
order condition which the futures position H has to satisfy in the optimum
is:
Ef kE [U
 (˜  
 )(f0   ˜ e1)] + Ef>kE [U
 (˜  
 )(f0   ˜ f)] = 0, (4)
where E  is the expectation operator with respect to the probability density
function of  , U  denotes marginal utility of proﬁt and an asterik indicates
an optimum level. Due to risk aversion marginal utility is decreasing, i.e.
U   < 0.
In the following we demonstrate that although the ﬁrm is facing a liquidity
constraint it nevertheless has an incentive to enter the futures market. Hence
premature liquidation of the futures position during maturity does not imply
that hedging policy becomes obsolete. Proposition 1 proves that the ﬁrm’s
optimum hedging amount is strictly positive.
Proposition 1. Liquidity constrained exporters hedge, i.e. H  > 0.
Closing out its futures position priort ot h ec o n t r a c t u a ld e l i v e r yd a t ed u e
to a variation margin to high to be ﬁnanced does not destroy the exporting
ﬁrm’s incentive to hedge ex ante. The ﬁrm optimally chooses a short position
in currency futures. This holds in general for all risk averse preferences.
Proof. We evaluate the ﬁrst-order condition (4) at H =0( M o s s i n1 9 7 3 ,
5p. 37):




   
H=0
= E[U
 (˜ e1PQ 0)(f0   ˜ e1)]
=  cov(U
 (˜ e1PQ 0), ˜ e1)),
which is strictly positive. Q.E.D.
Note that a vanishing hedging position, i.e. H =0 ,d r i v e st h et h r e s h o l dt o
inﬁnity and a liquidity problem cannot occur. Hence the random payo  from
as h o r tp o s i t i o ni nt h ef u t u r e sc o n t r a c to no n ec u r r e n c yu n i ti sf0   ˜ e1.O n
the other hand, notice that it is futures hedging and not international trade
that causes liquidity risk. Su cient liquidity is needed because of speciﬁc
institutional rules in futures markets like margin requirements.
Now we examine the optimal hedging decision.
2.2 Optimum hedge ratio
The exporter’s optimal risk management policydependsupon hispreferences.
Although the currency futures is unbiased, a unit hedge ratio only occurs
under speciﬁc preferences. Most important is the shape of marginal utility.
Consider a full hedge. A unit hedge ratio cannot mitigate all proﬁt risk,
since residual risk emerges from prematurely liquidating the futures position
during maturity. In what follows we show that it depends upon the sign of
the prudence measure U   /( U  )( K i m b a l l1 9 9 3 )h o wl i q u i d i t yr i s ka   e c t s
the ﬁrm’s hedging position. U    denotes the third derivative of the utility
function with respect to proﬁt and exhibits the convexity of marginal utility.
Proposition 2. (Prudent hedge theorem) The risk averse exporter un-
derhedges (fully hedges) [overhedges] random export revenue, if and only if
prudence is positive (zero) [negative].
Remark. Prudence is positive (zero) [negative] if and only if U    >
(=)[<]0. Suppose positive prudence, i.e. U    > 0. Then the exporter is
more sensitive to low proﬁts than to high ones. In other words, he has an
incentive to avoid low proﬁt realizations, which occur when high margin calls
emerge.
6Proof. We evaluate the ﬁrst-order condition (4) at H = PQ 0,w h i c hi s
called a full hedge of random export revenue:




   
H=PQ0
= Ef kE [U
 (f0PQ 0)(f0   ( ˜ f +˜  ))] +
Ef>kE [U
 ((f0 +˜  )PQ 0)](f0   ˜ f)
= Ef k(f0   ˜ f)U
 (f0PQ 0)+
Ef>k(f0   ˜ f)E [U
 (f0PQ 0 +˜  PQ0)]
= Ef>k(f0   ˜ f){E [U
 (f0PQ 0 +˜  PQ0)]   U
 (f0PQ 0)}.












=s g n {U
 (f0PQ 0)   E [U
 (f0PQ 0 +˜  PQ0)]}
=  sgnU
   
by Jensen’s inquality. This implies for optimum hedge:
sgn(PQ 0   H
 )=s g nU
   ,
since expected utility is monotone in the amount of hedging. Q.E.D.
Though the futures exchange rate f0 is perceived as unbiased by the
exporter the full hedge theorem does not hold. Liquidity risk creates an
additional proﬁt risk. This risk is endogenous because its magnitude depends
upon the hedging amount. A unit hedge ratio, which is optimal for quadratic
utility (i.e. U    =0 ) ,r e v e a l st h i sf a c t :v a r ( ˜  d)=0 ,w h e r e a sv a r ( ˜  u)=
var(˜  )(H )2 is strictly positive. (For the deﬁnitions, see section 2.1.) Hence
au n i th e d g er a t i od o e sn o ta s s u r er i s k l e s se x p o r tp r o ﬁ t s .
Corollary (i) If the utility function exhibits nonincreasing absolute risk
aversion, then the exporting ﬁrm underhedges its foreign exchange exposure,
i.e. H  <PQ 0. (ii) A quadratic utility function implies a unit hedge ratio,
i.e. H  = PQ 0.
Proof. Absolute risk aversion is measured by  U  /U .( i )(  U  /U )    0
implies U    > 0. (ii) U  is a linear function of export proﬁt. Therefore,
U    =0 . Q . E . D .
7Overhedging export revenue, i.e. H  >PQ 0,c a no n l yb eo p t i m a l ,i ft h e
exporter’s utility function exhibits increasing absolute risk aversion.
Without any liquidity problems of the exporting ﬁrm our economic setting
implies full hedging as optimum hedging policy. The economic intuition
for an optimal underhedge in case of a liquidity constraint is as follows.
Introducing some positive probability ofp r e m a t u r el i q u i d a t i o no ft h ef u t u r e s
position creates an additional risk. Then, even in an unbiased currency
futures market the beforehand riskless proﬁt becomes risky. To regain its
maximal expected utility, at least partially, the exporter reduces the hedging
volume in order to lessen the loss in expected proﬁt when closing out the
position. In other words, the threshold level increases and, therefore, the
probability of premature liquidation decreases.
As m a l l e rh e d g er a t i om e a n st h a ts o m ed i v e r s i ﬁ c a t i o ni sl o s t . T h i sr e a -
soning is captured by the substitution e ect between return and risk. But
there is also an income (wealth) e ect. With nonincreasing absolute risk
aversion the wealth e ect strengthens the substitution e ect leaving the ﬁrm
with an hedge ratio less than unity.
3. Export production and hedging
In the following sections export production is endogeous. We demonstrate
that under our liquidity constraint the so-called separation theorem is no
longer valid.
The cost function of export production Q is denoted by C(Q)a n de x h i b i t s
the usual properties: marginal cost C  is strictly positive and increasing,
C   > 0.
3.1 No separation
The exporting ﬁrm’s random proﬁts read:
˜  =˜ e1PQ  C(Q)+( f0   ˜ g)H, (5)
where ˜ g is deﬁned as before in equation (1).
The exporter maximizes expected utility of proﬁts EU(˜  ) by choosing Q
and H,a n d˜  i sd e ﬁ n e di ne q u a t i o n( 5 ) .
The ﬁrst-order conditions for an optimum are:
E[U
 (˜  
 )(˜ e1P   C
 (Q
 ))] = 0, (6)
E[U
 (˜  
 )(f0   ˜ g)] = 0. (7)
8Proposition 3. If the exporting ﬁrm faces a liquidity constraint to satisfy
margin calls from its futures position then the ﬁrm’s export production de-
cision cannot be separated from the ﬁrm’s hedging policy and depends upon
risk attitude and expectations.
Proof. Multiply equation (7) by P and add the result to equation (6). Re-
arranging terms and using the deﬁnition ˆ U ( )   U ( )/EU (˜  ) we obtain:
C
 (Q
 )=f0P + E[ˆ U
 (˜  
 )(˜ e1   ˜ g)]P. (8)
The second term on the RHS violates the separation theorem. Q.E.D.
The intuition of this result is that the futures contract does not exactly
mimic the foreign exchange exposure. In other words, random export rev-
enue, i.e. ˜ e1PQ  ,i si m p e r f e c t l yc o r r e l a t e dt ot h er a n d o mg a i no ft h ef u t u r e s
position, i.e. (f0   ˜ g)H. Hence, in principle, a perfect hedge is excluded.
3.2 Risk e ect on trade
How does the necessity to closing out the ﬁrm’s hedging position because of
liquidity problems a ect the exporter’s optimum export production? Let us
compare this scenario with the case in which there is no liquidity constraint.
Proposition 4. Introducing a liquidity constraint induces the exporting
ﬁrm to reduce export production.
Proof. (i) From equation (8), the deﬁnition of ˜ g in equation (1) and the
stochastic setting ˜ e1 = ˜ f +˜  , where E(˜  |f)=0 ,w eg e t :
E[U
 (˜  
 )(˜ e1   ˜ g)] = Ef>kcov [U
 (˜  
 ),˜  ] < 0, (9)
since the covariance term is negative. Hence from equation (8) the inequality
C (Q ) <f 0P holds. (ii) Let Q   denote optimum export production when
the liquidity constraint is not binding. Then C (Q  )=f0P.( i i i )T h ec o n -
vexity of the cost function then implies: Q   >Q  .Q . E . D .
The negative covariance in equation (9) reveales a risk e ect: covariance
is negative for the whole domain f>k ,w h i c hd e s c r i b e st h a tt h el i q u i d i t y
constraint is binding. In this domain proﬁt is increasing in  ,t h ed e v i a t i o n
between the random future spot rate at the end of maturity and the random
futures price during maturity (see ﬁgure 1). Last but not least marginal
9utility is (generally) decreasing in proﬁt. Taking the partial expected value
from negative covariances results in a negative magnitude.
Proposition 5. Suppose prudence is nonpositive, i.e. U      0.I fl i q u i d i t y
constraints become less severe, then optimum export production increases.
Remark. Common preferences in the literature of Economics and Fi-
nance, for example CARA, DARA and CRRA (see, e.g., Battermann, Broll
and Wahl, 2008), imply a positive prudence, i.e. U    > 0. In this case a
gradual deepening and widening of ﬁnancial markets in order to facilitate
the acquisition of liquidity may have an adverse e ect on international trade.
Proof. See appendix.
To sum up, the occurance of liquidity constraints for exporting ﬁrms
is negatively a ecting internationale trade. Real transactions in the open
economy are impeded. Therefore, some gains from trade may be lost.
4. Conclusions
In this paper we have studied the behavior of a competitive risk averse ex-
porting ﬁrm (exporter) under exchange rate risk. In order to hedge exchange
rate risk exposure, the ﬁrm has access to an unbiased currency futures mar-
ket. Futures contracts are marked-to-market and thus require interim cash
settlement of gains and losses of the futures position. Margin calls, how-
ever, may require tremendous ﬁnancial resources if the futures price is very
volatile.
In the presence of liquidity constraints the exporting ﬁrm may be forced
to closing out its futures position before maturity. A liquidity risk occurs
and destroys well-known results from the literature on futures hedging and
international trade.
First, the full hedge theorem is no longer valid. Still the ﬁrm has an
incentive to hedge. But futures hedgingc a n n o tp e r f e c t l ys c o p ew i t hp r o ﬁ t
risk coming from liquidity risk. The exporter may want to avoid that liquidity
supply fails which occur when high margin calls have to be satisﬁed. It
depends on prudence how the exporter weights low realizations of proﬁts
when the ﬁrm’s futures position must be liquidated. We show that if the
utility function exhibits positive prudence then the ﬁrm’s optimum hedge
ratio is less than unity despite of an unbiased futures market. For less hedging
means lower margin calls when the futures price moves against the ﬁrm.
10Second, the separation theorem is violated. Expectations and preferences
also determine export production. Premature liquidation impedes the ability
of the futures contract to mimic the random cash ﬂow from exports. Hence
hedging policy cannot alone take care of proﬁt risk. Optimum production
and hedging must be ﬁnd simultaneously.
Third, we show that a shortage of ﬁnancial resources hinders interna-
tional trade. When a liquidity constraint becomes binding the exporting
ﬁrm undoubtedly reduces export production. The important economic pol-
icy question, whether or not a graduald e e p e n i n ga n dw i d e n i n go fﬁ n a n c i a l
markets has a positive impact on trade ﬂows (as Chaney 2005 suggests in a
certainty trade model), has been answered in our paper. Under uncertainty
Chaney’s result may not be true and heavily depends upon preferences. This
may explain why empirical research on this matter is inconclusive.
Appendix: Proof of proposition 5
We start from equation (8). Rearranging terms we get:
0=( f0P   C
 (Q
 ))EU
 (˜  
 )+Ef>kE [U
 (˜  




























Partially di erentiating equation (10) with respect to L0 yields:
 F
 L0










   
k
E [U
 (˜  
 )˜  ]Pd (f), (12)
where  (f)d e n o t e st h ec u m u l a t i v ed e n s i t yf u n c t i o no ft h er a n d o mf u t u r e s
price.
(i) f0P   C (Q ) > 0, from the proof of proposition 4, step (i).
11(ii)  
 L0
   
k E [U (˜   )˜  ]d (f)= cov [U (˜   
u),˜  |f = k]Prob(˜ f = k)k  > 0,
since  u (see section 2.1) is increasing in  ,m a r g i n a lu t i l i t yo fp r o ﬁ t si s
decreasing and k  > 0.
(iii)  
 L0EU (˜   )=  
 L0
  k
0 E [U (˜   
d)]d (f)+  
 L0
   
k E [U (˜   
u)]d (f)=
E [U (˜   
d)   U (˜   
u)|f = k]Prob(˜ f = k)k  > (=)[<]0b yJensen’sinequality ,
if and only if U  is concave (linear) [convex] in proﬁt, i.e. U    < (=)[>]0.
The reason for this result is that random proﬁts ˜  u are more volatile than
random proﬁts ˜  d.
Combining the results from step (i), step (ii) and step (iii) for the case of non-
positive prudence (U      0) from equation (12) we get  F
 L0 > 0. Therefore,
from equation (11) we have the comparative static result
dQ 
dL0 > 0. Q.E.D.
Remark. U    =0i si m p l i e db yq u a d r a t i cu t i l i t y . F o rp o s i t i v ep r u d e n c e
(U    > 0) the comparative static analysis is inconclusive. If positive prudence
is strong enough (U    >> 0), we may have an adverse risk e ect, i.e.
dQ 
dL0 <
0. Hence optimum export production is not monotonically increasing or
decreasing in liquidity.
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